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Abstract 
Consumer boycotts and international economic sanctions represent a frequent tool to protest against countries for their 
violation of human rights. This paper questions if such a kind of action hurts more the populations it is supposed to 
defend than governing classes it is targeting. Overall, boycotts of more rapacious regimes may decrease more the well-
being of the population than the one of the governing class.
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     1 Introduction
The international community frequently assists to consumer boycotts of countries, for their
estimated violation of human rights. In 1959, a group of South African exiles and their
British supporters called for a boycott of fruits, cigarettes and other goods imported from
South Africa to oppose apartheid. Recently, Myanmar has been boycotted for its violent
repression of people manifestations. Finally, China is boycotted for the occupation in Tibet.
In the same manner, international economic sanctions (like embargoes) usually represent
a ﬁrst step used by the international community to protest against a country’s political
misbehavior.
However, one can wonder who does such a kind of action really hurt1? The targeted
governing class or local populations? Diﬀerent papers already mentioned potential adverse
eﬀects of consumer boycotts. For instance, several papers mentioned potential negative im-
pact of boycotting child labor on children well-being (Edmonds, 2003; Basu and Zarghamee,
2009). The traditional literature on economic sanctions (Kaempfer et al., 2004; Kaempfer
and Lowenberg, 2007) show that their eﬀectiveness depends on their diﬀerential impacts
between interest groups: they need to alter regime supporters’ well-being more than the op-
ponents’ one. To our knowledge, no study focusses on the fact that this diﬀerential impact
is likely to depend on the type of regime.
The aim of this paper is precisely to give a second thought on the opportunity to use con-
sumer boycotts or embargoes as a tool against autocratic regimes and to underline potential
counter-productive eﬀects of consumer activism. We argue that the diﬀerential impact is
likely to depend on three main characteristics of the boycotted regime: its level of openness,
its degree of voracity and its rising or declining trend.
Using a simple partial analysis framework, and relaying of the concavity of utility func-
tions, we show that consumer boycotts of very rapacious regimes are likely to hurt more local
(and poorer) citizens than the targeted political power of the boycotted country, especially
in the case of a rising regime. Conversely, boycotting a less rapacious regime is likely to be
more eﬀective to inﬂuence politicians behavior. Finally, economic openness is a key element
determining the overall boycott importance.
2 Boycotting a dictatorship or its local population?
Consider a country that is boycotted for an estimated violation of human rights. The aim of
the boycott is to hurt the governing class in power, so that it changes its behavior towards
human rights.
The governing class is assumed to only consider its own income in its utility function.
Thus only dictatorships are considered, and not democracies, in the sense that the governing
class does not care about the citizens well-being. The governing class may be more or less
rapacious. In particular, the political power captures a share α of the country resources (say
GDP), and local citizens only get a share (1−α) of those resources. α is then an indicator of
voracity . Assuming the utility of the governing class and of individual citizens is increasing
1When mentioning well-being, we refer here to income variation. Although income only represents a
partial factor of well-being (see Sen, 1979; 1980), we assume that income decrease is ceteris paribus always
related to a decrease in welfare.








∂α < 0. Subscript i = G,C represents the governing class and local citizens, respectively.
2.1 The income impact of the boycott
The consumer boycott reduces the country’s resources by an amount B. B thus represents
the global income impact of the boycott on the targeted country. B is likely to be directly
related to economic openness. An open country will have a large share of its resources coming
from exports (and thus large B), and vice versa. The global income impact is thus tends to
be more important in more open countries.
The global impact is decomposed between the governing class and the population: the
political income impact is denoted ∆IG(α) and the citizens income impact is denoted ∆IC(α).
Two allocation rules can be made considering the decomposition of the global income impact.
First, the linearity rule states that the two income impacts are directly related to the share
of income captured by the governing class: ∆IG(α) = αB and ∆IC(α) = (1 − α)B. Second,
the inverse allocation rule states that more rapacious regimes have the capacity to shift
the largest part of the boycott burden on their citizens: ∆IG(α) = s(α)B and ∆IC(α) =
(1 − s(α))B, with s(α) ∈ [0,1], and ∂s(α)/∂α < 0.
As will be shown, the allocation rule of the boycott losses is a crucial element, and
we thus need to understand which one is the most accurate. Actually, although providing
evidence that economic sanctions may impact both citizens and the governing class (Hoskins
and Nutt, 1997; United Nations, 2000), the literature does not provide evidence about the
way those losses are allocated. We argue here that the regime trend is the main element
determining the regime capacity to allocate the boycott losses. Indeed, it is reasonable to
think that rising regimes, with declining political opposition, are more able to allocate the
boycott losses according to the inverse allocation rule. Conversely, declining regimes, with
rising opposition, tend to be less able to enforce this rule, and thus allocate losses according
to the linearity rule. For the remaining of the paper, we will then consider that rising regimes
apply the inverse allocation rule, while declining regimes apply the linearity rule.
Consider now two dictatorships, that only diﬀer in their voracity: α > α. Focusing on
declining regimes, the political income impact tends to be larger in the α-regime than in the
α-regime, since the latter diverts a smaller share of the countries resources. In that sense,
in the case of declining regimes, consumer boycotts hurt more very privative dictatorships
than less privative ones: ∆IG(α) = αB < ∆IG(α) = αB. Conversely, focusing on rising
regimes, it is clear that the α-regime experience a lower income decrease that the α-regime:
∆IG(α) = s(α)B > ∆IG(α) = s(α)B. Then, in the case of rising regimes, consumer boycotts
hurt more less privative dictatorships than more privative ones.
The exact opposite relationship applies for the citizens income impact. Table 1 sums up
the income impact of this kind of boycotts, crossing openness, voracity, and the rising or
declining trend of the regime.
2.2 Regime voracity and the utilitarian impact of the boycott
However, economists usually prefer reasoning in terms of utility. A more privative regime
diverts ceteris paribus a larger amount of the countries resources: IG(α) > IG(α). Recalling
2Table 1: Income impact of consumer boycotts depends on openness, voracity
and the regime trend
Openness Open Economy Closed Economy
Large B Low B
Voracity α-regime α-regime α-regime α-regime
Global Impact Large Small
Declining regime
Political Impact Large Intermediate Intermediate Small
Citizens Impact Intermediate Large Small Intermediate
Rising regime
Political Impact Intermediate Large Small Intermediate
Citizens Impact Large Intermediate Intermediate Small





∂IG(α) . Then a same decrease in perceived income is less
costly in terms of utility for an α-regime than for an α-regime (see ﬁgure 1): income decreases
are usually perceived less costly to individuals with higher income. Overall, when focusing on
utilities, a consumer boycott potentially hurts more the governing class of an α dictatorship,
than the one of an α-regime, in the case of a rising regime.
The exact opposite reasoning applies for citizens. Since they have a lower income, citi-




∂IG(α) (see ﬁgure 2). In the case of rising regimes, a consumer boycott thus hurts more
local citizens if it takes place in an α-regime.
Moreover, those results also apply in the case of declining regimes, if the utilitarian impact
(described in this section) dominates the income impact (described in section 2.1).
3 Discussion
Is boycotting a country for its violations of human rights a good idea? The answer depends
crucially on the type of dictatorship that is considered. Do we consider a rising regime, able
to keep its opponents under control, or a declining regime that has to deal with more inﬂuent
political opposition? Is the regime very privative, or does it let a relatively large share of its
resources to its population? Is it an open or a closed economy?
When looking at income impacts, the allocation of the boycott burden is crucial. More-
over, this costs allocation crucially depends on the fact that the boycott takes place in a rising
or declining regime. In the case of a declining regime, i.e. if the political power allocates the
costs linearly according to its degree of voracity, the income impact to the governing class is
stronger in more rapacious regimes. Conversely, in the case of a rising regime, this income





















Figure 2: A same decrease in income is more costly for citizens in a more privative
regime
4When focusing on utilitarian impacts, consumer boycotts tends to hurt more local citizens
than the governing class in more privative regimes. The choice of such a type of instrument
is then questionable as it may miss its real target, i.e. the political power, while hurting
more the people it is supposed to defend.
Moreover, as mentioned before, the global income impact of the boycott is directly related
to openness: an open economy that is boycotted is likely to experience larger income decrease
(larger B) than a closed economy. Following the literature on institutions and openness
(Eichengreen, 2006), more stringent dictatorships tend to be less open to international trade,
and thus to have lower resource reduction than less stringent dictatorships: B(α) < B(α).
Considering this relationship between institutions and economic openness, it is also likely
that more privative regimes experience smaller scale boycotts than less privative regimes.
This analysis is valid in the short run, with no structural change in institutions (α) or
openness (B). If the boycott continues in the long run, the boycott may either enhance
revolt against the people in power or increase resentment against the boycotting countries.
The direction of this reaction depends on the type of dictatorship that is considered, but is
not straightforward. First, local populations are more hurt in very privative dictatorships,
anger against the cause of the boycott is likely to be higher. However, if the regime is very
strong and privative, it is likely to be very authoritarian, with eﬃcient propaganda, and then
able to contain eventual protests from the population and turning it toward the boycotting
countries.
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